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Abstract
I argue that ordinary (non-pathological) confabulation is a side-effect of an interpretive faculty that makes sense of the world 
by rationalising our experience within the context of a personal and cultural narrative. However, I argue that a hyperactiv-
ity of the same process manifests as schizotypy—latent schizophrenic tendencies—that can lead to extreme dissociation of 
interpretation from experience. I first give a phenomenological account of the process of interpretation, arguing that it is 
enacted through the creation of conceptual cognitive content from an originary non-conceptual experience. I then ground 
this account in empirical evidence, showing how our direct perception is moulded and adapted as it is conceptualised to fit 
our individual and collective expectations. Finally, I argue that hyperactive over-interpretation results in schizotypic dissocia-
tion, thus suggesting that schizophrenia should be understood as a disorder of interpretation, the extreme end of a spectrum 
that includes ordinary confabulation.
Keywords Confabulation · Schizophrenia · Conceptual content · Interpretation · Narrative self
1 Introduction
In this contribution to the special issue on confabulation, 
I argue that the human mind is an ‘interpretive organ’ that 
makes sense of the world and forms our identity by interpret-
ing our experience within the context of a narrative devel-
oped through our personal and cultural history. This ongo-
ing process involves an inferential rationalisation that often 
leaves gaps between the source of our actions and what we 
interpret ourselves as doing. Such gaps are frequently filled 
by confabulation, the unconscious creation of an objec-
tively-false but sincerely-believed narrative that attributes 
first-person agency and ownership to unconsciously-initi-
ated actions. While much of the literature on confabulation 
focuses on pathological cases, narrative-generation more 
broadly is essential to our self-identity and I argue that the 
process of interpretation—including confabulation—plays 
a key role in maintaining robust mental health. However, 
a hyperactivity of the same interpretive process manifests 
as schizotypy—latent schizophrenic tendencies—and can 
lead to an extreme dissociation of interpretation from experi-
ence. The study of confabulation, therefore, offers important 
clues in understanding the fine balance that storytelling and 
identity-creation maintain in the spectrum of mental health.
I argue this over four sections. In the first two sections, I 
give a theoretical background of the interpretive faculty and 
its relation to originary experience, arguing that confabu-
lation involves a conceptual mental content that is created 
from a more originary, non-conceptual experiential content. 
Drawing on a synthesis of the arguments made by Dreyfus 
and McDowell in their debate over the role of mental con-
tent in action, I argue that the interpretive act that underpins 
both narrative-creation and confabulation involves a trans-
lation of the non-conceptual content of our direct experi-
ence into the propositional, conceptual content of reflective 
consciousness. Such narrative-creation is itself, therefore, 
unconscious, as this very process creates the first-person 
subject of self-consciousness. I then ground this account in 
empirical evidence, using examples from psychology and 
neuroscience to show how our direct, unconscious modular 
perception is moulded and adapted as it is conceptualised 
to fit our individual and collective narratives. In the final 
section, I argue that a hyperactive form of this process leads 
to the dissociation that is the hallmark of schizophrenia, 
where an individual’s interpretation diverges both from its 
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objective source and from the collective cultural narrative. 
I close with some thoughts on future applications of work 
on confabulation and interpretation for mental and societal 
health.
2  Concepts, Coping, and Subjectivity
Human beings, according to a long tradition, are rational 
animals. We act for reasons, and common wisdom considers 
these to be transparent (at least to ourselves), and to con-
nect our actions with our beliefs about the world, ourselves, 
and our intentions. However, the phenomenon of confabula-
tion shows that the reasons we express for an action do not 
always align with what stimulates us to act. In this first sec-
tion, I will argue that our rationality has less to do with act-
ing for concrete reasons, which is something we share with 
other animals, but rather that rationality describes a form of 
cognition that has a conceptual, propositional content, one 
that is not shared with other animals, nor with our own spon-
taneous enactment of practised skills. I will argue that these 
two forms of content align with, and support, a model of the 
mind that posits two, interacting cognitive systems: a non-
rational faculty that enacts our spontaneous as well as auto-
matic moments of agency, contrasted with a deliberative, 
rational faculty which is the site of our conceptual cognition, 
and which interprets both the world and our own actions. 
A mismatch between the content of a subject’s beliefs and 
the intentional content of their actions, I will suggest, is the 
source of confabulation, both in normal, non-pathological 
cases, as well as in the more extreme cases resulting from 
brain injury or mental disorder.1
These two faculties, and their differing content, lie at 
the centre of Hubert Dreyfus’ debate with John McDow-
ell (Dreyfus 2005, 2007a, b, 2013; McDowell 2007a, b, 
2013). In this exchange, Dreyfus (2007a, p. 352) argues 
that our ‘smooth coping’—our pre-reflective embodied 
acts of agency—is “non-mental… non-conceptual, non-
propositional, non-rational and non-linguistic,” and must 
therefore be contrasted against what has traditionally been 
termed ‘thinking,’ that is, with formulating and deliberat-
ing on conceptual propositions. McDowell (2007a, p. 338), 
on the other hand, maintains that our basic experience is 
already conceptually articulated, in the sense that the content 
of our coping experience would undergo no transformation 
if we were to express it propositionally. That is, although 
we might not always explicitly articulate propositions, our 
actions and experience are structured such that they could 
be so expressed.
The debate is complicated by the centrality of the terms 
‘conceptual’ and ‘non-conceptual,’ which are the subject of 
ongoing debate in different philosophical traditions, with 
little consensus even on the nature of ‘concepts’ themselves. 
To understand the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell, 
it is important to appreciate what sense of conceptuality 
is at stake in coping, particularly over the extent that con-
cepts need to be general, public, and communicable—that 
is, propositional. Taylor (2002, p. 11) argues that we need 
some ‘minimal sense’ of conceptuality that is none of these 
things whenever we talk of an agent pursuing an activity, 
since coping “can’t be understood in just inanimate-causal 
terms.” At a bare minimum, any animal’s survival presup-
poses a capacity to ‘pick out’ what is relevant from what 
is not, although whether we ought to call this conceptual 
or not is a question of its own. But even if we were to call 
such minimal ‘picking-out’ conceptual, it would not be the 
form of conceptuality that is of real interest in the debate, 
what Rietveld (2010, p. 190) calls “strong rationality,” which 
should be distinguished from anything we ascribe even to 
higher animals. ‘Strong’ conceptual capacities are “depend-
ent on language-acquisition” and belong to a “linguistic or 
reflective faculty” (ibid).
‘Non-conceptual,’ as Dreyfus in particular uses it, there-
fore diverges from certain analytic discussions of non-con-
ceptuality. Carruthers (2011, p. 48), for example, uses ‘non-
conceptual’ to refer to sensory experience so fine-grained as 
to be inexpressible (such as the different shades of green in a 
meadow), but not the experienced green entities (the grasses, 
trees, shrubs) themselves. Saying, therefore, that animals 
lack (strong) concepts is not to say that they can’t experi-
ence trees or shrubs, nor does it imply that non-conceptual 
coping involves no experience of entities. Indeed, Dreyfus 
follows Heidegger in holding that sensory experience is 
normally always bound to the experience of a thing: “What 
we ‘first’ hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but 
the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle” (Heidegger 1962, 
p. 207). In the context of the debate, then, ‘coping’ aligns 
with the agency of what Zahavi (2005, p. 21), following 
Sartre, calls “pre-reflective consciousness,” in contrast to 
the “reflective” consciousness whose use of propositional 
concepts is uncontroversial.
1 There is an ongoing debate over whether perception also has a con-
ceptual content (see Crane 2013). However, even in cases of patho-
logical confabulation– such as when a patient does not believe their 
hand to be their own (Sandifer 1946, pp. 122–123)—the perception 
(of the hand) seems unaffected; it is the subject’s belief (that it is not 
their hand) that is at issue. One might argue that the issue is with the 
patient’s proprioceptive rather than visual perception, but Hirstein 
(2005, pp. 10–11) notes that patients with body dissociation continue 
to confabulate even when forced to admit that they do not have nor-
mal sensation or control over their body parts. Hence, throughout this 
paper I will be concerned rather with the conceptual content of belief, 
and what I will argue is the non-conceptual content of agency, while 
remaining open to other debates on this very complex topic (see 
Siegel 2016 for review).
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The debate, then, can be seen as over the extent and the 
manner in which our smooth-coping draws upon ‘strong’ 
reflective or propositional concepts, and centres on the ques-
tion of whether embodied agency can be understood inde-
pendently of conceptual rationality (McDowell 2007a, pp. 
344–345). Dreyfus (2007a, p. 354) believes it can, and most 
of his arguments are rooted in the observation that experts 
in various fields—baseball, chess, music—tend to perform 
at their best when they are not (reflectively) thinking about 
what they are doing. This, he argues, shows that concepts, 
which are evidently involved in thinking, must be absent in 
coping. One of Dreyfus’ favourite arguments is based on 
the case of baseballer Chuck Knoblauch, a major league 
second-baseman who became (in)famous after falling into 
a curious pattern of throwing errors. He would repeatedly 
make mistakes with simple throws, made over short dis-
tances when he had ample time ahead of him. Yet perhaps 
even more strangely, during the same period he remained 
capable of accomplishing very difficult throws under time-
pressure, with the high level of skill and accuracy that got 
him into the big leagues in the first place.
Dreyfus concludes from this story that Knoblauch’s prob-
lem was that, on the easy throws, he was thinking—that is, 
employing strong, abstract concepts. Rather than trusting his 
body to reflexively aim and complete the throw, Knoblauch 
became entangled in reflective thought, facing the concept-
heavy problem of calculating how hard and at what angle he 
should throw the ball he was holding, with the result that his 
throws were far less than perfect. During the high-pressure, 
complex throws—with no time to think—Knoblauch simply 
reacted with the refined, smooth-coping that he had formerly 
employed even on his simpler throws.
Extending this picture has many implications, including, 
as we will see, for the question of confabulation. Dreyfus’ 
assertion is that both our most expert as well as our auto-
matic, everyday actions occur without the linguistic, con-
ceptual mode of cognition that modern philosophy has long 
taken to be the mark of human mindedness (in Descartes’ 
‘cogito’ or Kant’s ‘Ich denke…,’ for example). Our coping 
utilises cognitive capacities that we share with non-human 
animals. This is in sharp contrast to McDowell who empha-
sises the difference between rational and non-rational ani-
mals. For while it is tempting to equate our smooth-coping 
actions with the behaviour of animals—as a fielder chasing 
a ball seems to act with the same smoothness and immediacy 
as a cat chasing a mouse—humans nevertheless are the only 
animals that can play baseball, because they are the only 
animal capable of learning the concepts of the equipment 
and the rules.
Of course, Dreyfus does not deny this. Rather, he wants 
to show not only the ways in which our experience parallels 
and diverges from that of animals, but more interestingly, 
how these two layers interact (Dreyfus 2007a, pp. 354–355). 
Indeed, Dreyfus’ account of embodied coping is tied to his 
account of skill acquisition, where (with his brother Stuart) 
he describes how any skill—from chess to baseball to riding 
a bike—consists of a learning period in which performance 
is clumsy and thought-out, only following which we get the 
absorbed, reflexive coping of the expert in action (Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus 1986, pp. 19–36). From this, he argues that 
there is a change in intentional content as knowledge shifts 
from one layer to the other.
For example, most drivers will recall their awkward early 
attempts at trying to time pushing the clutch and the accel-
erator and shifting the gearstick, and the embarrassing stalls 
when this doesn’t go to plan. Novice drivers are often taught 
to employ rules of thumb, such as changing gear at a certain 
rate of RPM, or to associate a certain gear number with a 
certain speed. Such rules are helpful, yet remain imperfect, 
and as the driver improves they learn through trial-and-error 
to adjust the rules to specific situations, such as climbing a 
steep hill. All the same, even as the driver becomes com-
petent, the phenomenological experience of the task is as 
intellectually ‘heavy.’ The driver must concentrate their 
attention on what they are doing, and novel situations may 
require explicit decision-making, an inner dialogue saying, 
for example, ‘this hill is really quite steep… I wonder if I 
should put it into second.’
For Dreyfus and Dreyfus, this sort of experience is con-
trasted against the highest stages of skill acquisition, which 
they call proficiency and expertise, where such explicit 
thinking plays a far smaller role. We can drive the wind-
ing country road while arguing with our passenger about 
whether our destination is before or after the bridge. As we 
climb the hill, we shift downgear automatically, our attention 
concerned with the amount of fuel left rather than the speed, 
RPM, or even the sound of the engine.
The phenomenological observation that explicit con-
cepts—‘thinking’ and rules—fade as we become proficient 
at a skill is the other side of the observation that reflection, or 
the introduction of explicit thought, disrupts smooth coping. 
In essence, explicit thought reverts us back to the beginner 
level, just as seemed to happen with Knoblauch. In a simi-
lar way, we might be confidently and automatically shifting 
through the gears as we round corners and climb hills, yet if 
we’re suddenly asked to draw our attention to just how hard 
we push the clutch or exactly when we pull the gearstick, it 
is more likely that we will make an awkward mistake. Just 
as, when learning to drive, we necessarily employ a great 
deal of conceptual propositions to achieve a rather imperfect 
performance, so when we reflect, our otherwise smooth cop-
ing is ‘disrupted,’ and we no longer perform as an expert.
McDowell would object that, while our expert gear-
change seems automatic, on attentive reflection we can 
attribute our downshift to an awareness of the car ‘strug-
gling.’ But Dreyfus emphasises that this is not how the 
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coping is phenomenologically experienced, invoking Sar-
tre’s famous example of his experience chasing down a 
streetcar. “When I run after a tram…” says Sartre (2004, 
p. 13), “there is no I… I am then plunged into the world of 
objects… which present themselves with values, attractive 
and repulsive values, but as for me, I have disappeared.” The 
street takes on a particular significance—the footpath, kerb, 
and other pedestrians appear as affordances or obstacles 
defined by the context of the action (cf. Gibson 1979, pp. 
127–129), and indeed have a different significance than they 
would in a different context, such as, for instance, if we were 
trying to find the café where we are meeting a long-separated 
friend. However, Dreyfus (2007b, p. 373) points out with 
interest that in reflection, Sartre “can’t help remembering 
himself” as the subject of his experience, when he actually 
does reflect backwards on it.
When Sartre says there is no ‘I’ in immersed experience, 
he is not claiming that the experience is not conscious, nor 
that it is not driven by an agent or self. Rather, what the 
phenomenology reveals is that prior to the experience of an 
‘I’ is what Zahavi (2005, p. 106) calls a ‘core’ or “minimal 
self.” This minimal self is “not something standing beyond 
or opposed to the stream of experiences but is rather a fea-
ture or function of its givenness” (ibid). While the ‘I’ of 
reflective consciousness is experienced as a subject among 
objects (and hence has a certain objectivity of its own), the 
‘core self’ is neither subject nor object of consciousness, 
but an integral element of it. Zahavi (2005, p. 126) therefore 
suggests that, rather than considering this self the ‘subject of 
experience,’ we think of it as the “subjectivity of experience” 
[my emphasis]. This distinction between the subjectivity of 
coping and the subject of reflection will be important as 
we go along, though it should also be kept in mind that the 
subjectivity refers to the specific ‘mine-ness’ of coping, and 
doesn’t imply that every aspect of coping is pre-reflectively 
conscious. As I will argue below, the phenomenon of con-
fabulation shows that elements that are outside even mini-
mal, pre-reflective consciousness can come to be interpreted 
in terms of the reflective ego.
3  The Rationalising Animal
It should already be becoming clear how the post hoc reflec-
tive rationalisation I have described relates to confabulation, 
which by definition involves the attribution of a proposition 
to an act of a subject. Before discussing confabulation in 
more depth, however, I want to argue that non-conceptual 
coping encompasses most of our actions, and that such 
actions are therefore non-rational—not in the sense that we 
don’t have reasons for them, but that they do not involve 
propositional content. In an important sense, this mode of 
everyday cognition is something we share with non-human 
animals, and is distinguishable from the exclusively-human 
conceptual cognition to which confabulation belongs.
It is important in this connection that we note Dreyfus’ 
stress on ‘everyday’ expertise. Focusing overly on the com-
plex actions of expert athletes or artists ‘in the flow’ seems 
to discount everyday activities such as running for a tram—
activities that still require practice, but not necessarily in the 
same intensive way as high-level baseball. But such every-
day activities are precisely the sort of thing that the theory 
of smooth-coping—in its Heideggerian origins—was devel-
oped to account for. A preoccupation with ‘experts’ leads us 
to forget that much of our daily life is actually lived (albeit 
‘inauthentically’) in a flow-like state, and that what makes 
the activities of experts so impressive is their accomplish-
ment of difficult tasks with the same non-rational reacting 
that most of us employ only on mundanities like crossing 
the street.
Following this line, Rouse (2013, p. 252) suggests that 
animals ought to be considered ‘experts’ who exemplify 
smooth-coping by reflexively accomplishing often-com-
plex tasks with a minimum of planning. Most animals, to 
be sure, do not learn most of their tasks, at least not in the 
conceptually-loaded way that we learn the rules of base-
ball or how to change a tyre. Yet they do seem capable of 
incredibly intricate everyday tasks, making them look so 
simple as to appear automatic, but in reality employing a 
finely-tuned discrimination of the highest degree. A squirrel 
rustling through a canopy, for example, is not just running 
along, but taking in its surroundings through sight and touch, 
finding grips, avoiding obstacles, judging the gaps between 
twigs and branches, and leaping over the larger ones.
Schear (2013, pp. 285–286) therefore frames the Drey-
fus-McDowell debate in terms of the ‘Venerable Thesis’—
homo est animale rationale: humans are to be understood 
in terms of their rationality, with rationality here defined by 
both Dreyfus and McDowell in terms of conceptual capaci-
ties. Schear spells out three possible outcomes. Firstly, it 
could be false; we might be contingently rational creatures 
who would still be recognisably human without a ‘strong’ 
rational capacity. Neither Dreyfus nor McDowell support 
this possibility. Secondly, a ‘weak’ form of the Thesis may 
be true. That is, rationality may be a central feature of the 
human, but it is only one of our capacities; no matter how 
important conceptual understanding is, there is a significant 
sphere of our life to which it does not apply. This seems to 
be Dreyfus’ position. Thirdly, we find the ‘strong’ Venerable 
Thesis, that rationality “is the form of the human as such,” in 
which rationality is understood to pervade and to be involved 
in all human activity, even that which does not seem to fit 
an understanding of rationality as ‘reflective thought’ or 
‘reason-grounded decision.’ McDowell appears “commit-
ted” to this reading (ibid, p. 290).
An Excess of Meaning: Conceptual Over-Interpretation in Confabulation and Schizophrenia 
1 3
McDowell (2007b, p. 369) illustrates this point by imag-
ining playing frisbee with a dog in the park. A passer-by 
wanders through the game, notices the frisbee sailing in her 
direction and, spontaneously, reaches out and catches it—a 
perfect example of what Dreyfus would call smooth-coping. 
McDowell fully grants that there is no reflective thought 
involved in this scenario. If asked for a reason why she did 
what she did, he suggests, she would be lost for words. “No 
particular reason,” she might reply, “I just felt like it.” None-
theless, McDowell maintains, her unreflective action was an 
exercise of her particularly human, rational capacities. Your 
dog, which might catch a frisbee just as spontaneously and 
effortlessly as our quick-reflexed new friend, would not be 
utilising any similarly rational capacities. “In the relevant 
sense,” says McDowell, “he has none” (ibid).
Although he doesn’t say as much, McDowell here makes 
an important distinction that is easily lost in discussions of 
reasons and rationality. In English (as in Latin) the root ‘rea-
son’ (ratio) covers two concepts that are distinct in other lan-
guages. In German, for example, we find the word Grund for 
‘reason why…’ (as in, our friend had ‘no reason’ for catch-
ing the frisbee), with Vernunft referring to the intellectual 
capacity. It is this second meaning of ratio that is at stake 
in the Venerable Thesis’ claim. As Okrent (2007, p. 110) 
points out, making a similar distinction between what he 
calls practical rationality and instrumental rationality, there 
is no controversy in granting animals Gründe or reasons for 
a certain behaviour—a wasp buries food for her unhatched 
babies, even if she could never be aware of that fact. Thus, 
even though we might poke around for a reason for the dog 
to catch a frisbee (to impress you? In hopes of a treat? For 
the sheer delight?), we have already seen with McDowell’s 
frisbee-catcher that the presence or absence of a clear Grund 
need not be connected to the presence of Vernunft.
It is Vernunft—conceptual rationality—that McDowell 
argues is pervasive in all human activity, and hence does 
not require the reflective deliberation that acting for reasons 
seems to imply. When McDowell says reason is pervasive, 
he does not mean that we actively weigh up Gründe for eve-
rything we do or see. Rather, he is talking about the capac-
ity that makes deliberating on such Gründe possible in the 
first place. The faculty of Vernunft is pervasive, McDowell 
believes, because it can be applied to any act of the human 
agent, even if the agent herself cannot express any propo-
sitional content more than ‘I don’t know why I caught the 
frisbee; I just felt like it.’ That is to say, since we can think a 
content for any embodied act, such actions themselves must 
already be conceptually articulated. By the same reason-
ing, since a dog is not capable of rational thought, the same 
action on its part must be non-conceptual.
But there is another possibility—that the distinctively 
human trait is not a conceptual rationality that is present in 
and accompanies our unreflective actions; rather, reflection 
itself is enacting that uniquely-human, rational (vernünftig) 
ability, which creates conceptual content out of the pre-
conceptual. Carman (2013, p. 175) accuses McDowell of 
overlooking such reflective interpretation of content, and 
committing what he calls the ‘Scholastic Fallacy,’ the “illicit 
projection of the structure and content of reflection into 
unreflective experience.”2 For Dreyfus, our basic coping is 
as momentary, reflexive and solicited as a dog’s, but we can 
interpret the content of that experience conceptually through 
our reflective faculty. Other animals, lacking this faculty, 
also thereby lack concepts.
Dreyfus (2007a, p. 360) locates in reflection an active 
process, a transformation of the pre-conceptual, embodied 
action into a conceptual thought. “Reflection rationalises” 
says Carman (2013, p. 166), emphasising that reflection is 
not a passive ‘looking’ at an already conceptual coping, but 
an active modification of primordial, embodied experience. 
When we reflect, we are not simply making a more explicit 
expression of the content of our involved smooth-coping. 
Rather, says Dreyfus (2007a, p. 360), “reflection must intro-
duce some other content.” Reflection doesn’t just discover 
the implicit content; it creates it.
‘Create’ does not necessarily signify the act of a con-
scious ego-self; indeed, in several theories of consciousness 
(e.g., Dennett 1991; Baars 2002), what we call the subject or 
‘ego’ might itself be said to be created through this reflec-
tive process. What is happening here is not a case of some 
homuncular self observing and making propositions about 
the content of memories, but a process of rationalisation 
that creates that very content, including the subject of the 
reflector, which is to say, the first-person. This subject or 
‘narrative self’ is distinct from but dependent on the ‘mini-
mal’ or ‘core’ self discussed above, which is an essential 
and inalienable component of the experiences around which 
the narrative self is constructed via acts of propositional 
reflection (Zahavi 2005, p. 105; Schechtman 2011, p. 398). 
Since the ego arises simultaneously as a feature (that is, 
the subject) of reflective propositional content, we—as that 
first person—are not usually aware of creating such con-
tent, which is experienced as though it were always there. 
Dennett (1991, p. 250) has argued that this storytelling is 
central to our sense of self, and while such stories generally 
derive from our direct experience, he observes that our con-
scious mind frequently ‘confabulates’ while constructing the 
2 O’Regan (2000) calls this kind of thinking the ‘refrigerator light 
illusion.’ Just as we should not conclude that the fridge light is always 
on because it seems to be every time we open the door to check, 
neither should we conclude than an experience is always concep-
tual (or conscious, etc.) because we encounter it this way each time 
we ‘check’ by reflecting. Cf. Dreyfus, above, on how Sartre ‘always 
finds’ the ego in reflection.
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narratives that explain our actions, noting that such narra-
tives feel convincing even when they are demonstrably false.
Gazzaniga’s (1998a, b; Gazzaniga et al. 1977) work with 
split-brain patients also suggests that rational explanations 
come after the fact, and can be completely and unconsciously 
fabricated. In one experiment (Gazzaniga 1998a, p. 133), he 
tells the speech-less right brain hemisphere of a patient to 
“take a walk.” As the patient stands up to go, he then asks 
the left-brain what it is doing. The left-brain replies with an 
explanation along the lines of ‘oh, I need to get a drink,’ to 
rationalise the behaviour it has found itself performing. In 
another experiment (1998b, p. 53), both sides of a split brain 
are shown unrelated images (the right-side a snowy scene, 
the left a chicken claw) and each asked to choose a relevant 
matching image. After each side has chosen (a snow shovel 
and a chicken, respectively) the verbal left-brain was then 
asked to explain why it chose these two, unrelated images. 
Without hesitation, it replied that the shovel was to ‘clean 
out the chicken coop.’3
Split-brain confabulation occurs as one-half of a brain 
rationalises without all of the necessary details available to 
it. Yet as Dennett (1991, p. 418) argues, the seamlessness of 
such confabulation demonstrates that such storytelling is as 
much a part of our normal functioning as web-spinning is for 
a spider’s, and is crucial for our self-identity, a “fundamental 
tactic of self-protection, self-control, and self-definition” (cf. 
Zahavi 2005, p. 110). Self here, as should be clear, refers to 
more than the minimal subjectivity of experience, but to the 
‘narrative self,’ a sense of persisting and evolving identity 
constructed through embodied habit and episodic mem-
ory, through which all reflective experience is interpreted 
(Schechtman 2011, p. 398). Supporting Dennett’s claim, 
we find many examples of non-pathological or ‘broad’ con-
fabulation. In Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) famous study, 
healthy participants were found to overwhelmingly choose 
the rightmost pair of identical sets of pantyhose as their 
‘favourite,’ and yet to justify their choice based on what 
they perceived as its aesthetic and tactile qualities. Wheat-
ley (2009, p. 216), on examining these and similar cases—
including Libet cases, where subjects’ feelings of initiating 
an action are argued to follow its initiation in the brain—
argues that ‘patient’ and ‘normal’ (that is, pathological and 
non-pathological) confabulations are differences in degree 
rather than kind, arguing that the latter “sound better because 
they are based on apriori, causal theories shared by healthy 
minds.” That is to say, what makes pathological confabu-
lation stand-out is not the fact that it occurs, but that it is 
unusually disconnected from the personal and communal 
experience of the confabulator.
Several studies (Ackil and Zaragoza 1998; Ceci et al. 
1994) have shown that young children also confabulate, fill-
ing in details of remembered events either spontaneously, 
or in line with the suggestions of experimenters (Ceci et al. 
2007). While normal subjects show some susceptibility to 
suggestion—a phenomenon that shows links with the inter-
pretive faculty involved in confabulation (Gheorghiu and 
Kruse 1991, pp. 60–61)—the increased suggestibility and 
confabulation among young children probably stems from 
the differing rates of development of different memory sys-
tems. For example, Tulving (2005, p. 32) has argued that 
our episodic memory (the ‘mental time-travel’ of re-living 
experienced events) develops later (around 4–5 years) than 
our semantic memory of facts. In one study (Taylor et al. 
1994), children were asked to explain how they knew new 
facts they had learned earlier in the day (in this case, novel 
colour names like ‘chartreuse’). While older children would 
describe the earlier teaching session, children aged 3–4 years 
would typically confabulate, claiming, for example, that they 
had ‘always known’ the name. Once again, the confabula-
tion is a case of rationalisation without full access to expe-
rience, this time due to under-developed episodic memory 
rather than a severed corpus collusum. Similarly, in cases of 
dementia, the episodic memory systems on which the narra-
tive self depends deteriorate while the minimal self remains 
functionally intact (Summa 2014, p. 482). Such patients may 
have severe deficits in short- or long-term memory, or both, 
and their confabulation represents a synthesis of their pre-
sent situation with more ingrained habits and whatever con-
textualising memories can still be brought to mind (Örulv 
and Hydén 2006).
The key lesson from these observations is that rationali-
sation occurs spontaneously and makes use of the pre-con-
scious information at its disposal, which therefore includes 
accounting for gaps in that information. The stories we tell 
ourselves and others to explain our actions are therefore con-
tingent on the information we have access to, and don’t nec-
essarily line up with the entire chain of events. The reflective 
mind imposes reason on its own embodied behaviour. We 
seem therefore to have an inbuilt tendency to construct and 
to believe very complex narratives to explain our actions, 
but our reasoning may be only incidentally or inferentially 
related to the reasons why we do what we do. Sartre’s obser-
vations, above, show that the ‘I’—the sense of being a sub-
ject—only appears on reflection, as the central peg on which 
the narrative is fixed. As Dreyfus (2007a, p. 356) puts it, 
only when I step back or reflect—either in remembering a 
past action, or when my smooth-coping is interrupted—can 
I “then retroactively attach an ‘I think’ to the coping and take 
responsibility for my actions.”
3 It is rather uncanny that it seems to feel most natural to Gazzaniga 
and other writers, including myself, to refer to half of a split-brain– 
which speaks as a conscious person– as an ‘it’ rather than a ‘he’ or 
‘she.’
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This account has many parallels with Carruthers (2011) 
‘interpretive sensory access’ (ISA) theory of self-knowl-
edge, which he has also applied to explain confabulation 
(and schizophrenia). Carruthers argues that humans have a 
single mental faculty underlying our attributions of propo-
sitional attitudes, and that we acquire self-knowledge in the 
same way that we acquire knowledge of others—through 
the interpretation of sensory data. Self-knowledge is only 
privileged to the extent that we have access to additional 
sensory data such as inner speech and proprioception, yet 
since the interpreter only has access to that data which is 
present to consciousness, it is not ‘immune’ to error, and 
frequently infers the wrong source of its actions—that is, it 
confabulates.
However, my account differs from the ISA in some 
important ways. Carruthers seems to identify the mind with 
propositional, reflective consciousness, which takes non-
conceptual sensory impressions and forms representations 
of concepts (which for him include objects, relationships, 
and so forth), which themselves comprise the input of an 
interpretive module. Unlike Carruthers, neither Dreyfus nor 
McDowell endorse a representational theory of mind, and 
for Dreyfus in particular, pre-reflective experience is not the 
result of an inner subject representing an outer world, but a 
being-in-a-world that is already-interpreted in terms of sig-
nificance. As I have argued above, such interpretations are 
not primordially conceptual. Our experience while coping is 
neither of ‘mere’ sensory impressions nor of propositional 
content, but of meaningful entities and the possibilities they 
afford—a cake for eating, a frisbee for throwing, a dog for 
teasing. It is only via breaking out of coping into reflective 
consciousness that such entities show up as objects, that is, 
as the object of propositional contents.4 Since Carruthers 
does not distinguish between these two modes of experi-
ence, he therefore fails to capture the subtle but important 
distinction between what Dreyfus calls non-conceptual and 
conceptual experience. A consequence of this, as Sass et al. 
(2011, p. 9) have noted, is that it seems to locate subjectiv-
ity in the created subject of the narrative self, and imply 
that beings lacking this subject therefore lack awareness of 
mental states. Thus, where Carruthers locates consciousness 
after the transition into conceptual content, I follow Dreyfus 
and other phenomenologists in distinguishing two different 
modes of awareness on either side.
At the heart of my account, then, is a model of the mind 
involving two distinct forms of content. Firstly, conceptual 
content is tied to explicit, linguistic thought and is created 
through the process of reflection away from a more primor-
dial intentionality. That second but prior form—the content 
of our embodied coping—is therefore contrasted as non-
conceptual. Our brief look at cases of confabulation, both 
normal and patient, shows that the phenomenon belongs to 
the former, involving the conceptual, propositional content 
that is abstracted from prior, non-conceptual enactment. In 
the next section, I will argue that these two forms of content 
stem from two modes of cognition, with the latter arising 
from the interpretation of experience into the construction 
of the narrative self.
4  Projection and Interpretation
The above phenomenological account is supported by an 
increasing body of evidence from neurology and the cogni-
tive sciences. A large literature on skill-acquisition (Polanyi 
1966; Collins 2000, 2010; Sutton et al. 2011)—that, like 
Dreyfus, distinguishes between explicit, propositional 
knowledge and tacit, embodied habitual knowledge—finds 
neurological parallels in recent work showing that uncon-
scious, habitual skills and actions are associated with the 
basal ganglia and other mid-brain regions (Graybiel 1998, 
2008; Lombo and Gimémez-Amaya 2014), while the evalu-
ative monitoring associated with deliberation and problem-
solving takes place primarily in the cortex. Hirstein (2005, p. 
180), too, traces confabulation principally to the operations 
of the pre-frontal cortex. This dichotomy is also reflected 
in the distinction between episodic and semantic memory 
mentioned above, with the semantic memory of habitual 
knowledge associated with the mid-brain, while the episodic 
memory of subjective experience is centred on the pre-fron-
tal cortex (Vandekerckhove et al. 2014). Of particular sig-
nificance, too, is the fact that both propositional, deliberative 
content and episodic memory only appear all together in 
mature human beings, which is consistent with the human 
cortex being the part of the brain that has evolved most sig-
nificantly from what we share with non-human animals. 
Supporting this, Nelson (2003, p. 33) has argued that the 
narrative self emerges in early childhood as a “new subjec-
tive level of conscious awareness” tied to our acquisition of 
language.5 Yet, as Parnas and Sass (2011, p. 525) stress, this 
richer, reflective, language-based selfhood remains neverthe-
less based on the “necessary foundation” of a minimal self.
The human brain is, of course, one of the most complex 
structures in nature, and its many parts do not work in isola-
tion. It would be an oversimplification to say that the pre-
frontal and other cortical regions house the rational mind, 
4 Heidegger (1962, p. 196) distinguishes between the ‘hermeneutic-
as’ of our involved practical dealings, and the ‘apophantic-as’ of an 
object of reflective detachment. See Bergamin (2016, Chap. 3) for an 
extended discussion of Heidegger’s two ‘as-structures’ and their rela-
tion to mental content.
5 Thereby situating one of the key motifs of both Heidegger (1993) 
and McDowell (1994) in developmental psychology.
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in opposition to a more primitive, habitual lower brain. The 
self, consciousness, and rational agency all emerge from the 
functioning of the brain as a whole. Nevertheless, from the 
correlations that I and many others have noted—from Kah-
neman’s (2011) ‘slow’ and ‘fast’ brains, to the ‘predictive 
processing’ model (Clark 2016), to what Davies (2014) calls 
the ‘old’ and ‘new’ brains—there is a growing cognitive 
scientific consensus around a ‘two-systems’ model of the 
mind as comprising two forms of cognition: first, a reflexive 
mode, centred on the lower and mid-brain, that responds 
habitually to direct sensory feedback, and largely outside of 
attentional consciousness; and a second which is rational in 
the vernünftig sense—self-conscious, deliberative, linguis-
tic—and centred on the cortex (cf. Martinez-Valbuena and 
Bernacer 2014).
Humans are, of course, not alone in our interpretive abili-
ties. There is a sense in which all animal life can be said to 
‘interpret’ the world, insofar as they functionally represent 
elements of their experience as relevant to their survival 
(Millikan 1993, pp. 92–93). But ‘higher’ animals can also 
interpret the world in terms of other agents and their inten-
tional actions. Chimps, for example, are well-known for their 
excellent intersubjective awareness. They can follow the 
gaze of conspecifics and often alter their behaviour accord-
ingly (Tomasello et al. 1998, pp. 1067–1068; Povinelli and 
Eddy 1996, pp. 133–134), with subordinate chimps, for 
example, avoiding food that they know a more dominant 
ape has seen hidden, yet going for it when they know the 
latter remains ignorant (Hare et al. 2001, p. 144). They also 
show an awareness of competitors’ intentions, and attempt 
to conceal their actions when there is a possibility of being 
caught out (Melis et al. 2006, p. 160). Nevertheless, chimp 
intelligence seems to belong to the habitual, embodied mode 
of cognition, involving intuitive ‘insight’ rather than reflec-
tive ‘foresight’ (Seed and Byrne 2010, pp. R1035–R1036; 
cf.; Köhler 1925). Furthermore, although some animals 
approach human intelligence in their recognition of objects 
or kinship relations, it is only in mature human beings that 
all of these elements come together, and are mediated by the 
conceptual capacities that create the appropriate, reflective 
distance for rational thought (McDowell 2007a, p. 346; cf. 
1994, pp. 57, 115).
Such animal analogues offer an evolutionary explanation 
of our tendency to attribute agency to events. An animal’s 
survival is not well-served by wondering whether the rus-
tling in the grass is the wind or a tiger; it is safer to act first 
and ask questions later, even if the wind rustles far more 
often than tigers. Along similar lines, it also makes sense 
for evolution to hard-wire in social responses—it serves a 
social creature better to swiftly detect who is an ally, who 
is a threat, and what these friends and foes have in mind, 
than to lose time logically deducing such relationships. 
Human beings are also hardwired to be sensitive to these 
relationships, as Cosmides and Tooby (1992) have shown, 
noting what they call a ‘cheater detection mechanism’ that 
calls our attention to scenarios where one of our group is 
acting unfairly (cf. van Lier et al. 2013). Yet such mecha-
nisms are not confined to unconscious or ‘intuitive’ cogni-
tion, but interact with our conceptual reasoning, and in some 
cases facilitate it. For example, logical problems such as 
the ‘Wason Selection Task’ (Wason 1966) are much more 
quickly and intuitively solved when framed in terms of social 
contracts than when presented as an abstract logic puzzle 
(Cosmides and Tooby 1992, p. 184).
If animals can directly perceive agency, and social ani-
mals can directly perceive others’ intentions, then we should 
not be surprised that complex socio-cultural animals like 
ourselves project intentional agency and mindedness onto 
the world. And this is indeed what we see, in our relation-
ships not only with ourselves, but in the ways we deal with 
nature and with technology. We say that the dog is jealous 
of the cat, which may or may not be true, but also that our 
iPod is jealous of our iPhone, which certainly is not (Luhr-
mann 2010). We talk about our computers as ‘thinking’ and 
our cars as ‘tired.’ A storm sailing over the plains may feel 
purposive, seeking to hunt us down as we cycle frantically 
towards the village. Indeed, Piaget (1929) related animist 
and nature religions to an innate tendency to project agency 
onto natural objects, such as the weather, fire, and plants and 
animals, while Abram (1996, p. 303) has more recently sug-
gested that reflective rationality grows out of an embodied 
knowledge that projects the action of mind onto perceived 
objects and events.
Therefore, I argue, the human experience of agency both 
extends and diverges from that of other animals along the 
lines of the two cognitive systems I described in the previous 
sections. To the extent that we share habitual, non-concep-
tual embodied cognition with other animals, we possess the 
capacity to directly perceive elements of the world as having 
agency. Yet we also, through the exclusively-human concep-
tual cognition centred in our fully-developed cortices, inter-
pret actions as the rational acts of other agents. This extends 
from natural events, like storms, to artefacts, like computers, 
as well as to the acts of conscious beings—including our-
selves. On this account, then, confabulation is tied to self-
consciousness, and is the rational, conceptual interpretation 
of our own spontaneous, non-conceptual agency.
5  Schizotypy as Over‑interpretation
I have so far been arguing that confabulation, as a mismatch 
between our interpretative faculties and the source of our 
agency, is a symptom not only of pathological cross-wiring, 
but also of ordinary sense-making, revealing the partially-
contingent nature of the interpretation of our primordial 
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experience into propositional, conceptual content. In this 
final section, I will explore the consequences of this account 
for mental health, suggesting that the narratives formed by 
our interpretive faculties are essential for a stable sense of 
self. However, I will argue that a hyperactivity of interpreta-
tion results in a schizotypal personality, leading in extreme 
cases to schizophrenia.
Philosophers such as Dennett (1991, 1992), Taylor 
(1989), and Schechtman (2011) argue that our personal iden-
tity and consciousness of ourselves as selves are depend-
ent on the stories that we (and others) tell, which create a 
coherent (and shared) narrative of an agent acting over time. 
Such accounts, I have suggested, are consistent with, and 
dependent on, the interpretive faculty I have been arguing 
for, with its creation of propositional content from immersed 
experience in the act of rationalising the content (and gaps) 
of memory. These narrative selves are, to a large degree, a 
self-reinforcing loop, as decisions are justified to fit the nar-
rative, which is itself constructed as the sum of past choices 
and events.
This process plays an important role in maintaining 
robust mental health. In its spontaneous operation, it rein-
forces a sense of empowerment and agency, as in Nisbett and 
Wilson’s (1977) study mentioned above, where a choice that 
was essentially meaningless (since the pairs of pantyhose 
were identical) became a vehicle for the chooser’s values 
(good quality, and so on). The same principle can, over time, 
encourage ownership of poor or potentially-regrettable deci-
sions, by building them into a narrative where they were 
‘meant-to-be’ or led ultimately to positive outcomes. Car-
ried to an extreme, such a tendency may become a hubristic 
belief that one’s decisions never err. But in moderation, the 
ability to own and justify one’s choices leads on the one 
hand to the acceptance of misfortune and growth through 
incorporating it into one’s life-story, while on the other hand 
avoiding a Hamlet-like paralysis in the face of challenging 
dilemmas (cf. Frankl 2004). Yet even this positive aspect 
involves the alteration of memories over time, as reasons 
are justified and stories repeated, slowly diverging from an 
original experience that may itself have been unconsciously 
confabulated.
Such confabulation is natural, and while unconscious, it 
nevertheless makes use of contextual cues that guide the 
subject’s interpretation of their experience, in what might be 
described as a form of inferential, albeit intuitive, reasoning 
(Örulv and Hydén 2006, p. 653; cf. Carruthers 2011, p. 328). 
Similarly, since normally-functioning minds are ‘wired’ to 
detect patterns and agency, ‘illusory pattern perception’—
the detection of pattern-like sequences in random stimuli—is 
surprisingly common (Williams and Griffiths 2013). ‘Schiz-
otypal’ minds are particularly prone to over-interpreting situ-
ations to see patterns which aren’t there (Davies 2014, p. 91). 
Coincidences take on additional “salience” (Kapur 2003, 
pp. 14–15) and random events are incorporated into a larger 
meta-narrative that makes sense of the world, although in 
ways that diverge significantly not only from the prevailing 
cultural narrative, but from what the subject could reason-
ably deduce from their experience.
‘Schizotypy’ refers to a “latent personality organisation” 
that has many of the symptoms of schizophrenia, including 
noticeable behavioural, emotional, and perceptual abnor-
malities, but falls short of the more intense, and frequently 
psychotic, dissociation that marks full-blown schizophre-
nia (Ettinger et al. 2015). ‘Latency’ here indicates a “latent 
liability” to developing schizophrenia, although the path of 
development includes a complex mix of neurological and 
cultural-environmental factors, and there is no single deter-
mining factor that predicts whether a schizotypal personality 
remains sub-clinical or develops more serious schizophrenic 
symptoms (Lenzenweger 2015).
On the neurological level, until very recently the leading 
neurological theory of schizophrenia placed a central role 
on the overproduction of dopamine (Davies 2014, p. 91), 
although it should be noted that the neurotransmitter’s exact 
role in schizophrenia is now the subject of serious debate, 
and neuroscience is still not in a position to say what, if 
any, causal role it plays in the precise mix of chemical and 
environmental causes (Kendler and Schaffner 2011, p. 59). 
There remains, nevertheless, a correlation between excessive 
dopamine and schizophrenic symptoms. Schizophrenics, 
during psychotic episodes, show a heightened synthesis of 
dopamine, and a higher release of it in response to impulses, 
while dopamine-stimulators such as amphetamines can pro-
duce or amplify acute psychotic effects in schizotypal per-
sonalities (Kapur 2003, pp. 14–15). Negative correlations 
further support this picture, with anti-psychotic medications 
functioning by blocking dopamine receptors, and thus pre-
venting the overactive pattern-recognition and reinforcement 
that would otherwise occur (ibid, p. 16).
Dopamine is found in all multicellular animals, and plays 
an important role in the learning and reward system, where 
its release accompanies and reinforces successful actions 
and pattern recognition (Barron et al. 2010). Specifically, 
its release accompanies behaviour that it benefits the animal 
to repeat. These tend to be attraction or avoidance, and so 
dopamine has often been described as both reward and pun-
ishment (ibid), although contrary to popular misconception, 
the dopamine itself is not the reward—it is not a ‘feel-good’ 
chemical like endorphins. Its function is rather to stimulate 
the repetition of an action, and to increase the expectation 
of a reward.
Dopamine therefore plays an important role in habit for-
mation, and is crucial to the operation of the non-concep-
tual skill-acquisition discussed above (Graybiel 2008, pp. 
370–371). Davies (2014, pp. 91–92) links this process with 
pattern-recognition and argues that, phenomenologically, we 
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are confronted with patterns first as feelings, which are then 
rationalised as they rise into propositional consciousness—
an account which is consistent with my understanding of 
conceptual consciousness as arising through interpretation. 
Thus, it is not the presence of excessive dopamine per se 
which is the issue here, but rather its effect on the operations 
of the cortically-centred interpretive faculty, since, unlike 
many other psychiatric disorders, schizophrenia appears to 
have no analogues in other animals (Ogawa and Vallender 
2014). Schizophrenia and schizotypy might therefore arise 
as a disorder of the human, conceptually cognitive faculty of 
interpretation, and indeed, some researchers have suggested 
that schizophrenia is a “maladaptive by-product of changes 
in the brain that led to the human-specific traits of language, 
social cognition and interpersonal behaviour” (ibid; cf. Crow 
1997; Burns 2004; Horrobin 1998).
I therefore suggest that we understand schizotype-spec-
trum disorders as characterised by an excess of interpreta-
tion, detecting patterns in the ‘random noise’ of ordinary 
sensory and emotional stimulation. Such over-interpreta-
tion would also account for the more sensory symptoms of 
schizophrenic psychosis, such as hallucination, which Kapur 
(2003, p. 15) argues are “exaggerated, amplified, and aber-
rantly recognised internal percepts” (cf. Grossberg 2000; 
Bentall 1990). For example, our cortex contains specific 
modules that interpret faces, language, and nefarious actions 
such as cheating (Kanwisher and Dilks 2013; Cosmides and 
Tooby 1994). Overactive interpretation therefore explains 
such hallucinations as seeing faces in complex visual input 
like clouds or wallpaper, or hearing voices in ambient noise, 
as well as paranoid symptoms like inferring malevolent 
intentions in other people.
Similarly, Kapur (2003, p. 15) argues that schizotypal 
delusions are “essentially disorders of inferential logic, 
as most delusional beliefs are not impossible, just highly 
improbable.” That is to say, while such delusions may be 
far-fetched, they are often held together with an internal 
logic that puts them on a spectrum with ordinary world-
views. Indeed, logically-consistent but unjustified beliefs are 
as widespread today as they have been throughout history, 
as witnessed by the everyday superstitions and ritualised 
routines practised even by professional rationalists. These, 
I have suggested, are only slightly distanced from the eve-
ryday confabulation that we perform to interpret and give 
meaning to our actions.
A further correlation between interpretation, confabu-
lation, and schizophrenia is supported by the convincing 
links that Barron et al. (2018) have made in multiple stud-
ies connecting schizotypy to belief in conspiracy theories 
and magical thinking. Magical thinking is not necessarily 
pathological, being an almost ubiquitous feature of pre-
industrial societies, and which is often not, strictly-speaking, 
irrational, since it may, as I suggested earlier, stem directly 
from interpreting natural events as enactments of agency. 
However, van Prooijen et al. (2018) have drawn connec-
tions between supernatural beliefs in modern societies, 
belief in conspiracy theories, and the ‘illusory pattern per-
ception’ that is a key feature of schizotypy, while Whitson 
and Galinsky (2008) have demonstrated links between ‘illu-
sory pattern perception’ and feelings of a lack of control. 
The formulation of and belief in conspiracy theories—the 
“belief that the world or an event is manipulated by omni-
present and omnipotent agents in the pursuit of malevolent 
goals” (Barron et al. 2018, p. 15)—takes such thinking to an 
extreme, where a single force (the government, the ‘deep-
state,’ the Illuminati, the Jews—themselves all understood as 
single-minded actors) is taken to be responsible for a range 
of unrelated events, both on the macro-scale (political and 
economic events), and the micro-scale of individual lives 
(surveillance, manipulation, and so on).6 None of these 
links imply that ordinary ‘illusory pattern perception’ leads 
to schizotypy, much less schizophrenia; rather, they support 
the hypothesis that these (latent or overt) pathologies lie at 
the extreme end of a spectrum that begins with our ordinary 
interpretive faculties.
Kapur (2003, p. 13) has noted that the content of schiz-
ophrenic delusions is culture-specific—a South African 
villager might attribute perceived persecution to an evil 
shaman, while a Canadian urbanite might interpret similar 
feelings as the machinations of the Mounties. A religious 
voice-hearer might hear angels, while an atheist receives 
messages from aliens. This suggests that the inferences of 
schizotypes are drawn from the extensive web of beliefs that 
they have both inherited from their culture, and established 
over a lifetime. Conspiracy theorists are notoriously difficult 
to argue with, not only because their beliefs tend to be unfal-
sifiable, but because their belief schema—the meta-narrative 
of conspiracy—provides a ready framework for the infer-
ence and incorporation of any new facts. Yet this process of 
interpretation is not, of itself, pathological, but is rather an 
extension or over-reaction of the everyday confabulation that 
causes subjects not only to find reasons for preferring one 
pair of pantyhose over an identical one, for example, but to 
genuinely believe that they do.
The parallels to confabulation indicate that, although 
schizotypal and psychotic delusions, conspiracy theories, 
and magical thinking are all inferences drawn between per-
ceived patterns within a particular cultural milieu, they are 
not necessarily the result of conscious reasoning. Rather, 
they appear in consciousness—as propositional, conceptual 
6 The degree to which a conspiracy theorist feels personally, rather 
than abstractly, targeted by such forces seems to correlate to states of 
pathological paranoia rather than latent schizotypy, and may warrant 
further investigation.
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content—through the process of interpretation of primordial, 
non-conceptual experience, within the context of an existing 
belief schema acquired through enculturation and repeated 
practice. Phenomenological accounts support this, with 
Parnas and Sass (2011, p. 537) arguing that schizotypy and 
schizophrenia are characterised by what they call “hyper-
reflexivity,” where objects which would ordinarily form part 
of the non-conceptual background are forced into conceptual 
consciousness. Less salient elements—including features of 
the perceptual environment along with kinaesthetic bodily 
sensations, ‘inner speech,’ and the processes or presupposi-
tions of thinking—become elements of experience in their 
own right, which must be accounted for as part of the sub-
ject’s immediate and longer-term understanding. Just as a 
dementia patient confabulates to make sense of the living 
room she doesn’t recognise, the schizophrenic needs to find 
an explanation of the thoughts he doesn’t identify with. Sass 
et al. (2011, p. 9) have argued that this hyper-reflexivity is 
a disorder of the minimal self, but I suggest that the issue 
should be situated rather in the transition—that is, during 
the interpretation of pre-reflective, non-conceptual experi-
ence into the conceptual content that becomes the object 
to the subject of the narrative self. The minimal self, as an 
underlying subjectivity, is still present prior to this transi-
tion, at least as the shadow of the not-self that is experienced 
as intruding. It may be possible that, in extreme cases, the 
entire process and even the core self break down completely. 
In such cases, it is difficult to imagine phenomenologically 
what such a breakdown would be like, or to conceive of a 
consciousness without any sense of subjectivity, not even a 
subjectivity disconnected from all sense of its own agency. 
But here, perhaps, we start to approach what Jaspers (1997, 
pp. 27, 98) described as the “un-understandability” of 
psychosis.
For this very reason, Parnas and Sass (2001, p. 102) 
recommend investigations into the phenomenology of 
schizophrenia begin with schizotypy (cf. Zahavi 2005, pp. 
133–134). And through exploring the links between con-
fabulation and schizotypic thinking, I have suggested that the 
root issue lies neither with the minimal nor narrative selves 
per se, but with the interpretation of content that creates the 
latter from the former. The spontaneous and unconscious 
rationalisation, revealed in confabulation, that powers this 
interpretive faculty also hints at the difficulties in dealing 
both with paranoid delusions, as well as irrational but non-
psychotic conspiratorial thinking. Kapur has stressed that 
there is no ‘overnight cure’ to schizophrenia, since com-
plete recovery requires the patient to process and change 
their belief schema, and the way in which they understand 
themselves and their relation to the world. Anti-psychotic 
drugs provide only symptomatic control; they “do not pri-
marily change thoughts or ideas” but rather “provide a neu-
rochemical milieu in which new aberrant saliences are less 
likely to form and previously aberrant saliences are more 
likely to extinguish” (Kapur 2003, p. 17). That is to say, they 
moderate the hyperactivity of the interpretative faculty—
and hence stop the over-interpretation of patterns—but they 
are unable on their own to affect the belief schema through 
which that faculty operates. However, by focusing on the 
‘belief schema,’ Kapur risks overlooking how the problem 
is situated in interpretation itself. Treatment, therefore, can-
not simply involve (the often painstaking) persuasion of a 
patient to conceptually adjust their meta-narrative, but must 
also focus on the pre-reflective interpretive process that cre-
ates the very content of that narrative.
6  Conclusions
In this paper, I have argued that our sense of self as subject 
arises from an interpretive faculty that creates conceptual 
content from our immediate experience, incorporating it into 
the narrative of our life-story and inherited cultural beliefs. 
This faculty is above all a pattern-detector, and wired to 
perceive certain elements, such as faces, language, and—
importantly, in terms of this special issue—agency. The 
phenomenon of confabulation occurs when our rational 
mind interprets its own pre-reflective agency through the 
lens of the social and cultural expectations in which it is 
immersed, with a tendency to interpret its actions in ways 
that give us agency and ownership, even on occasions when 
this is not fully justified. I have suggested that this plays a 
role in maintaining robust mental health. However, I have 
argued that excessive or hyperactive interpretation results in 
schizotypal-spectrum disorders. Schizophrenia, I have sug-
gested, therefore has its roots in the over-interpretation and 
misapplication of conceptual content.
I argued this by first fleshing out the distinction between 
conceptual and non-conceptual content through a discus-
sion of the Dreyfus-McDowell debate. I argued that Drey-
fus’ phenomenology reveals a distinction between our enact-
ments of embodied, reflexive skill, and the reflection on such 
enactments that rationalises it into a propositional content. 
I argued that McDowell’s criticisms did not refute such a 
distinction, but helped to refine our understanding of ration-
ality not as an expression of ‘reasons why’ (Gründe) as such, 
but as a faculty of linguistic, reflective distance (Vernunft). 
I followed Carman in holding that the propositional content 
of this faculty is not always present, but is actively created 
in the process of reflective rationalisation. I argued that cases 
of non-pathological confabulation demonstrate this process 
and the resulting gap between experience and reflection, and 
that more severe cases are the result of an impaired access to 
the originary experience. I then drew upon neurological and 
psychological evidence to locate this interpretive faculty in 
the higher, cortical brain regions in which, together with the 
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episodic memory on which it relies to function correctly, it 
belongs to a cluster of capacities that separate human beings 
from non-human animals.
Thus, I argued, confabulation is a side-effect of the nor-
mal functioning of our rational, interpretive faculty. In ordi-
nary cases, this faculty combines our experience with our 
expectations—both personal and cultural—in order to give 
meaning to our actions, confabulating to fill in or pass over 
gaps and inconsistencies in those combinations. This faculty 
aims, above all, at coherence and consistency between our 
experience and the meta-narrative or ‘belief schema’ through 
which it operates, and which it is geared to prioritise over 
what we might call objective reality. Therefore, in cultures 
with a large place given over to magical thinking, the agency 
of supernatural forces finds a greater role in interpretation.
In all cultures, however, there is a small subset of peo-
ple who over-interpret their direct perceptions. Schizotypal 
personalities—due, I have suggested, at least in part to the 
effects of the excessive action of cortical dopamine—per-
ceive cause, effect, and agency in coincidental events, and 
detect patterns in random noise. In extreme or psychotic 
cases of sensory over-interpretation, this leads to hal-
lucinations; in cases of agency, it leads to delusions and 
the perception of powerful supernatural forces, as well as 
unrealistic, confabulated beliefs about the self—identify-
ing with a role or even a personality that is not one’s own. 
Like ordinary confabulation, these interpretations are medi-
ated through the prevailing culture, and in some sense are 
a rational integration of over-interpreted experience with a 
distorted meta-narrative—with a resulting feedback loop 
that increases dissociation from public, communal narra-
tives. Schizophrenia, therefore, ought to be thought of as a 
disorder of that interpretive faculty which gives rise to our 
narrative, rational concept of self.
My account is an empirical one, combining philosophi-
cal concepts with evidence from neuropsychology, and the 
links I have suggested should continue to be testable as our 
knowledge of the brain improves. Yet its implications are 
also cultural, for I have suggested throughout that the activ-
ity of the embodied brain is not separable from its cultural 
milieu. Much work has already been done on the ways dif-
ferent understandings of psychosis in pre-industrial societies 
affect integration and recovery (e.g., Peters 1982). But the 
more interesting questions, to my mind, arise from the frag-
menting shared meta-narrative of our post-industrial soci-
ety, and particularly the increasing influence of conspiracy 
theories in the digital age (which themselves spread through 
the dopamine-stimulating networks of the web and social 
media). If schizophrenia is an extreme example of the con-
fabulatory interpretation that marries our experience with 
our personal and cultural narratives, what are the implica-
tions for ourselves as interpreters when those narratives are 
in flux?
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